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Abstract - Web application security is a critical issue. Security concerns are often scattered through 
different parts of the system. Aspect oriented programming is a programming paradigm that 
provides explicit mechanisms to modularize these concerns. In this paper we present a technique for 
detecting and preventing common attacks in web applications like Cross Site Scripting (XSS) and 
SQL Injection using an aspect oriented approach by analyzing and validating user input strings. We 
use an aspect to capture input strings and compare them to predefined patterns. The intrusion 
detection aspect is implemented in AspectJ and is woven into the target system. The resulting 
system has the ability to detect malicious user input and prevent SQL Injection and Cross Site 
Scripting. We present an experimental evaluation by applying it to an insecure web application. The 
results of our tests show that our technique was able to detect all the attempted attacks without 
generating any false positives. 
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Abstract - Web application security is a critical issue. Security 
concerns are often scattered through different parts of the 
system. Aspect oriented programming is a programming 
paradigm that provides explicit mechanisms to modularize 
these concerns. In this paper we present a technique for 
detecting and preventing common attacks in web applications 
like Cross Site Scripting (XSS) and SQL Injection using an 
aspect oriented approach by analyzing and validating user 
input strings. We use an aspect to capture input strings and 
compare them to predefined patterns. The intrusion detection 
aspect is implemented in AspectJ and is woven into the target 
system. The resulting system has the ability to detect 
malicious user input and prevent SQL Injection and Cross Site 
Scripting. We present an experimental evaluation by applying it 
to an insecure web application. The results of our tests show 
that our technique was able to detect all the attempted attacks 
without generating any false positives. 
   
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ser and critically important company information 
is managed using web applications. For this 
reason, web applications serve as a door for 
attacks. The vulnerabilities present in the application can 
be exploited by an attacker. Even with the rapid 
development of Internet technologies, web applications 
have not achieved the desired security levels. As a 
result, web servers and web applications are popular 
attack targets. 
Two common attacks on this type of systems 
are Cross Site Scripting (XSS) and SQL Injection. SQL 
Injection is a technique where an intruder injects SQL 
code into the user input field in order to modify the 
original structure of the query to post hidden data, or 
execute arbitrary queries in the database. Cross Site 
Scripting occurs when an intruder injects and executes 
scripts written in languages like JavaScript or VBScript. 
Aspect Oriented Programming is a 
programming paradigm that provides explicit 
mechanisms to modularize crosscutting concerns 
(behavior that cuts across different divisions of the 
software) such as security. This makes it a good 
candidate for applying security to a system. 
 
 
 
Author α Ω
 
: Department of Computer Engineering, Polytechnic 
University of Tirana, Tirana, Albania. 
 
E-mails : ekajo@fti.edu.al, lorena.kodra@gmail.com
 
In this paper, we propose an Aspect Oriented 
protection system that detects and prevents attacks on 
web applications. This system analyzes and validates 
user input strings. We use an aspect to capture input 
strings and compare them to predefined patterns. The 
intrusion detection aspect is implemented in AspectJ 
and is woven into the target system. The resulting 
system has the ability to detect malicious user input and 
prevent SQL
 
Injection and Cross Site Scripting. The 
advantage in using aspect oriented programming lies in 
separating the security code from application code. In 
this way it can be developed independently to adapt to 
new attacks.
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents principles of SQL
 
Injection, XSS
 
and 
AOP. Section 3 presents related work in this area and 
our proposed solution. Section 4 describes in detail the 
architecture of our system and its integration with the 
web application. Section 5 describes the 
experimentation and evaluation results. Section 6 
concludes and discusses some future work.
 
II.
 
BACKGROUND
 
a)
 
SQL Injection
 
SQL Injection consists in inserting malicious 
SQL commands into a parameter that a web application 
sends to a database in order to execute a malicious 
query. As a result, database contents can be corrupted 
or destroyed. The most popular techniques used in SQL 
injection are tautology, union, and comments.
 
The general idea behind tautology is finding a 
disjunction in the WHERE
 
clause of a SELECT
 
or 
UPDATE
 
statement and inserting malicious code into 
one or more conditional statements so that they always 
evaluate as true. Let us consider the case where the 
web application authenticates users by executing the 
following query:
 
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 
‘admin’ and password = ‘pass’
 
This query doesn’t select any rows because the password is 
incorrect. Injecting ’
 
OR 1=1
 
gives:
 
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 
‘admin’ and password = ‘‘ OR 1=1’
 
This causes the WHERE
 
clause to be true for 
every row and all table rows are returned.
 
The UNION
 
clause allows the chaining of two 
separate SQL
 
queries. An attacker can use this clause 
U 
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to manipulate an SQL statement into returning rows from 
another table. As an example, consider the following 
query that allows users to get the product name by 
inserting the product ID.
Keywords : symbolic information, artificial intelligence,
Flow control, Architecture.
  
   
 
 
SELECT productName FROM products WHERE 
productID = '5'
 
An attacker can use the UNION clause to modify the 
structure of this query to:
 
SELECT productName FROM products WHERE 
productID = '5' UNION SELECT username, 
password FROM users
 
As a result, this query will display the product 
name together with the usernames and passwords of 
the users table.
 
Another type of SQL
 
Injection uses comments 
to cut an SQL
 
query and change its structure. The part 
of the SQL
 
statement that comes after the comments 
will not be executed and the query will return the results 
that the attacker wanted. For example the following SQL 
statement:
 
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 
‘alice’ and password = ‘alice123’
 
can be 
transformed in the following way:
 
SELECT * FROM
 
users WHERE username = 
‘admin’ --
 
and password = ‘’
 
The query will return all the information about 
the admin user.
 
b)
 
Cross Site Scripting
 
Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
 
is an attack done 
towards the user’s browser in order to attack the local 
machine, steal user information or to spoof the user 
identity. The attacker uses a web application to send 
malicious code usually in the form of a script. Together 
with the legitimate content, the users get the malicious 
script from the web application. This attack is successful 
in web applications that do not validate user input.
 
c)
 
Aspect Oriented Programming and Security
 
Aspect Oriented Programming is a 
programming paradigm whose aim
 
is to solve problems 
like code scattering and code tangling that cannot be 
solved by traditional programming methodologies. Code 
scattering means that the problem code is spread over 
multiple modules. This means that when developers 
want to fix a bug they
 
have to modify several source 
files. Code tangling means that the problem code is 
mixed with other code. In the case of web applications, 
security code needs to be applied in different modules 
of the system. This process is error prone and difficult to 
deal with. AOP
 
is a good candidate for applying security 
in web applications. The security code can be 
encapsulated into modules called aspects which can be 
maintained separately from the web application in order 
to adapt to new attacks.
 
III.
 
RELATED WORK AND PROPOSED 
SOLUTION
 
During recent years, different solutions have 
been proposed to address security issues in web 
applications. The most efficient way to protect against 
XSS
 
and SQL
 
Injection attacks is to inspect all the data 
the user inserts into the system, hence most of the work 
in this area treats user input.
 
Zhu and Zulkerine propose a model-based 
aspect-oriented framework for building intrusion-aware 
software systems [2]. They model attack scenarios and 
intrusion detection aspects using an aspect-oriented
 
Unified Modeling Language (UML)
 
profile. Based on the 
UML
 
model, the intrusion detection aspects are 
implemented and woven into the target system. The 
resulting target system has the ability to detect the 
intrusions automatically.
 
Mitropoulos and Spinellis propose a method for 
preventing SQL
 
Injection attacks by placing a database 
driver proxy between the application and its underlying 
relational database management system [1]. To detect 
an attack, the driver uses stripped-down SQL
 
queries 
and stack traces to create SQL
 
statement signatures 
that are later used to distinguish between injected and 
legitimate queries. The driver depends neither on the 
application nor on the RDBMS.
 
Hermosillo et al. present “AProSec” 
implemented in AspectJ
 
and in the JBoss AOP 
framework, a security aspect for detecting SQL
 
Injection 
and XSS [3]. They use the same aspect for dealing with 
SQL
 
Injection and XSS.
 
Their experiments show the 
advantage of runtime platforms such as JBoss
 
AOP
 
for 
changing security
 
policies at runtime.
 
We propose a system that performs a two-step 
validation of user input. In the first step it is validated 
syntactically to check whether it contains dangerous 
characters that can be used in XSS
 
and SQL
 
Injection. 
In the second step, the input is validated by the SQL 
validator in the context of a query to check whether it 
contains always true statements, comments or 
combinations of SQL
 
keywords. In contrast to the 
systems described above, our system analyzes directly 
user input before it
 
is being used as part of an SQL 
query. This facilitates the analyzing process. Another 
advantage of our system is the fact that the SQL 
validator checks the presence of SQL
 
keywords in the 
user input. This prevents attacks that do not contain 
comments or always true statements but contain SQL 
keywords that can modify the original structure of the 
SQL
 
query. Our system does not generate false 
positives because it considers as attack the presence of 
a combination of SQL
 
keywords and not the presence of 
a single SQL
 
keyword such as “Union” that might be 
part of a legitimate user name.
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IV. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Our system consists of three parts. The first and 
the most important part is an aspect called 
WebAppInputFilter that contains the logic of the whole 
defense process. It defines the advices that control the 
validation process as well as the steps to be taken 
(code to be executed) based on the results of the 
  
   
 
  
validation. The aspect also contains the pointcuts that 
define the vulnerable points of the web application and 
allow the weaving with the advice code. The second part 
consists of a validators class that validate against XSS 
and SQL
 
Injection attacks the input defined in the 
advices. The third part consists of an encoder which 
encodes dangerous characters by converting them to 
their decimal equivalent, leaving them harmless.
 
The basic idea behind our technique is to 
capture user input and validate it by comparing it to 
predefined patterns. In the case of SQL
 
Injection, in 
contrast with current solutions [1, 2, 3], the user input is 
validated before being used as part of a query. The final 
query is a combination of user input and a partial SQL 
statement defined by the developer. We consider as 
safe the part of the query that is defined by the 
developer, so there is no need to validate it and we only 
validate the user input part. This facilitates and speeds 
up
 
the evaluation process.
 
The validation process happens in two steps. 
First the user input is validated to check whether it 
contains dangerous characters such as ‘<’,’ >’, ‘=’
 
and’ 
–‘ that can be used to perform XSS
 
and SQL
 
Injection 
attacks. In the second
 
step, the SQL
 
Validator analyzes 
the input in the context of the query. This is done to 
check whether the query contains combined SQL 
keywords that can modify the original structure of the 
query or SQL
 
code that can transform the original query 
in an SQL
 
statement that results always true.
 
Figure 1 shows the flow of information within the 
defense system. The aspect captures the user input 
string and sends it to the first analyzer. If the string is not 
dangerous it is passed on to the second validation step. 
If the string is dangerous it is send to the encoder. It 
encodes the dangerous characters and the result is 
passed to the SQL
 
Validator. If the string is not 
considered dangerous, it is passed on to the web 
application as a legitimate request. If it is considered 
dangerous, it is erased.
 
 
 
Fig. 1 :
 
The flow of information within the defense 
system
 
a)
 
The WebAppInputFilter Aspect
 
This aspect is implemented in AspectJ [7]. This 
is the most widely used language for aspect oriented 
programming. It represents the extension of Java for 
dealing with aspects. The aspect defines pointcuts in 
the vulnerable points of the web application. It
 
monitors 
the traffic in servlets and captures some specific calls 
that implement the ServletRequest
 
and 
HttpServletRequest
 
interfaces. The pointcuts are:
 
pointcut pcGetParameter(): call(String 
javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest.ge
tParameter (String))
 
pointcut 
pcGetParameterValues():call(String [] 
javax.servlet.ServletRequest.getParamete
rValues(String))
 
b)
 
The Validators
 
The validators class handles both XSS and SQL
 
Validators. It uses regular expressions and pattern 
matching to validate user input against specific patterns.
 
The syntactic validator, analyzes separately 
each character of the user input string and acts as a 
filter that allows only characters ‘a-z’, ‘A-Z’,
 
numbers ‘0-
9’, 
 
spaces and characters like “.” and “,”. The rest of 
the characters are considered dangerous and will be 
sent to the encoder.
 
The SQL
 
Validator consists of several validation 
strings in the form of regular expressions that are 
matched against user input according to different 
possibilities of injecting SQL
 
code into the user input 
field of the web application. The validation criteria 
include: always true comparisons (both string and 
numeric), presence of quotes or comments, keywords 
for executing stored procedures, combinations of SQL 
keywords like UNION, SELECT, DROP, INSERT, ALL,
 
etc. As regards this least evaluation criterion, it protects 
in cases where no comments or always true statements 
are present in the query but it still may contain 
dangerous keywords that can execute arbitrary 
Towards full protection of web applications based on Aspect Oriented Programming
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operations in the database. We would also like to 
emphasize that the SQL Validator doesn’t simply detect 
the presence of SQL keywords, but the presence of 
combined SQL keywords that would potentially modify
the original structure of the query. This means that input 
strings that simply contain SQL keywords (like UNION) 
will not be considered dangerous unless they contain 
some other SQL keyword that would create a risk for 
SQL Injection. This eliminates the false positive case of 
detection when a legitimate user has for example the 
word “Union” in their name.
V. EVALUATION RESULTS
We evaluated our system by using it against a 
vulnerable web application [8]. First we tried all sorts of 
SQL Injection and XSS injection attacks to see how the 
system behaved. Then we protected it using our system 
  
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
but were unable to bypass the application’s security.
 
For example, let’s assume that an attacker tries 
to input the following script into the web application:
 
<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
 
The system will detect the dangerous 
characters “<”, “>”, “(“, “)”
 
and “/”
 
and encode them. In 
this way this input string will be considered as a simple 
string and not as a script and will not be interpreted by 
the browser. A wiser attack would be to encode the 
input string by using some encoding scheme (decimal, 
hexadecimal, octal, Unicode, etc) prior to inserting it into 
the web application. For example, the above string in 
hexadecimal format (\xNN) would be:
 
\x3c\x73\x63\x72\x69\x70\x74\x3e\x61\x6c
\x65\x72\x74\x28\x64\x6f\x63\x75\x6d\x65
\x6e\x74\x2e\x63\x6f\x6f\x6b\x69\x65\x29
\x3c\x2f\x73\x63\x72\x69\x70\x74\x3e
 
Even in this case the attack wouldn’t be 
successful because the system detects the usage of “\” 
and encodes the string to make it harmless. We tested 
our defense system by using other encodings (decimal, 
octal and Unicode) and none of the attacks were 
successful.
 
In the case of SQL Injection, let’s assume that 
an attacker tries to inject a query that contains a 
statement that is always true into the system:
 
SELECT * FROM user_data WHERE last_name 
= 'Smith' OR ‘1’=’1’
 
The SQL Validator will detect that there is a 
statement that is always true and will delete this string 
without passing it to the web application.
 
In order to evaluate the impact of the defense 
system in the performance of the web application we 
measured its response time using [9] under two 
scenarios. We measured the response time first in the 
absence of any defense and then in the presence of our 
defense
 
system. We used a mix of input strings: 
harmless, XSS
 
attack and SQL
 
Injection attack strings. 
For every scenario we used 356 POST
 
and 104 GET 
requests which make a total of 460 requests. We 
executed the series of requests 5 times and measured 
the average
 
response time. Our defense system 
introduced an average overhead of 2.11%. We feel that 
this is an acceptable level of overhead for use in many 
production environments and it will not be noticeable by 
the user.
 
VI.
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
 
We have presented our approach for building a 
security system for a web application. This system 
detects XSS
 
and SQL
 
Injection attacks in requests. Our 
system was built separately and the initial code of the 
web application was not modified. This allows the 
separation of security concerns and allows the security 
system to be evolved independently from the web 
application to adapt to new attacks.
 
As an advantage to similar solutions, besides 
checking for comments and always true statements, our 
SQL
 
Validator
 
also checks for the presence of a 
combination of SQL
 
keywords in the input string. This 
can protect in cases where comments or always true 
statements are not present in the query but it still may 
contain dangerous keywords that can execute arbitrary 
operations in the database. Our system does not simply 
check for SQL
 
keywords but for a combination of them. 
This is considered as an advantage in eliminating false 
positives like in the case of having for example the word 
“Union” as part of a legitimate user name. Furthermore, 
in contrast to usual solutions, when protecting against 
SQL
 
Injection our system analyzes directly the user input 
before being used as part of a query. There is no need 
to analyze the whole query because the other parts of it 
are defined by the developer and are considered safe. 
This has the advantage of facilitating and speeding up 
the evaluation process.
 
Our system can be improved in some 
directions. A possible improvement might be the 
implementation of defense against other form of attacks. 
Also new techniques like machine learning
 
and neural 
networks
 
can be used to detect more sophisticated 
attacks. Another direction of improvement might be the 
implementation of runtime weaving
 
using the JBoss 
AOP
 
Framework [10].
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